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Abstract (max 250).  
The underpinning assumption of much research on cognitive individual differences (or group 
differences) is that task performance indexes cognitive ability in that domain. In many tasks 
performance is measured by differences (costs) between conditions, which are widely 
assumed to index a psychological process of interest rather than extraneous factors such as 
speed-accuracy trade-offs (e.g. Stroop, Implicit Association Task, lexical decision, 
antisaccade, Simon, Navon, flanker and Task Switching). Relatedly, RT costs or error costs 
are interpreted similarly and used interchangeably in the literature. All of this assumes a 
strong correlation between RT-costs and error-costs from the same psychological effect. We 
conducted a meta-analysis to test this, with 114 effects across a range of well-known tasks. 
Counterintuitively, we found a general pattern of weak, and often no, association between RT 
and error costs (mean R=.17, range -.45 to .78). This general problem is accounted for by the 
theoretical framework of evidence accumulation models, which capture individual 
differences in (at least) two distinct ways. Differences affecting accumulation rate produce 
positive correlation. But this is cancelled out if individuals also differ in response threshold, 
which produces negative correlations. In the models, subtractions between conditions do not 
isolate processing costs from caution. To demonstrate the explanatory power of synthesising 
the traditional subtraction method within a broader decision model framework, we confirm 
two predictions with new data. Thus, using error costs or RT costs is more than a pragmatic 
choice; the decision carries theoretical consequence that can be understood through the 
accumulation model framework. 
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Public significance statement: 
Our meta-analysis reveals that reaction time costs and error costs from the same 
psychological effects do not correlate, contrary to widespread assumption. This is explained 
if people vary in both caution and cognitive abilities. We demonstrate this by simulating data 
from four models in the broad family of evidence accumulation models. Individual 
differences in behaviour should not be assumed to solely reflect individual differences in 
ability in a cognitive domain.  
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Introduction 
Sixty years ago prominent psychologists worried about an inevitable parting of ways 
between two disciplines of psychology, as eloquently highlighted by Cronbach (1957):  
No man can be acquainted with all of psychology today... [There is] plentiful 
evidence that psychology is going places. But Whither?...The personality, social and 
child psychologists went one way; the perception and learning psychologists went the 
other; and the country between turned into desert. (p. 671-673) 
The different sides across the desert followed different approaches: on one side, differences 
between individuals were the very focus of study, while on the experimental side “individual 
variation is cast into that outer darkness known as "error variance"” (Cronbach, 1957, p. 674). 
It might therefore please Cronbach that experimental tasks are now increasingly employed in 
the study of individual differences. This bridge is occurring across several fields, for example 
in cognitive neuroscience in the search for neural correlates of performance (e.g. Kanai & 
Rees, 2011; Sumner, Edden, Bompas, Evans, & Singh, 2010); in mental health research in the 
search for cognitive predictors for disease or endophenotypes of genetic risk factors (Carter 
& Barch, 2007); or in the search for cognitive mechanisms underlying personality dimensions 
such as impulsivity (Cyders & Coskunpinar, 2011, 2012; Sharma, Kohl, Morgan, & Clark, 
2013; Sharma, Markon, & Clark, 2014). However, the interpretation of individual variation in 
cognitive tasks turns out to be less straightforward than is often assumed; counterintuitive 
phenomena occur in the “outer darkness”. 
One of the cornerstones of experimental psychology is the subtraction method 
(Donders, 1868|1969), in which performance in one experimental condition is subtracted 
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from another condition involving additional processes, to calculate a performance 'cost' or 
'effect' assumed to largely isolate the processes of interest from more general factors such as 
arousal or speed-accuracy trade-offs (Broota, 1989, p. 396; Gravetter & Forzano, 2015, p. 
266; Greenwald, 1976, p. 315). Examples include well known effects in widely used tasks 
across multiple domains, such as the Eriksen Flanker effect (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), 
Stroop effect (Stroop, 1935), Simon effect (Simon & Wolf, 1967), antisaccade cost (Hallett, 
1978), remote distractor effect (Walker, Kentridge, & Findlay, 1995), SNARC effect 
(SNARC; Dehaene, Dupoux, & Mehler, 1990), Navon global and local effects (Navon, 
1977), task-switching cost (Jersild, 1927; Monsell, 2003), implicit association effect (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), attentional effects (Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, 
& Posner, 2002), and lexical decision costs (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971).  
These kinds of performance costs typically occur in both reaction times (RT) and 
error rates, and terms such as ‘Stroop effect’, 'implicit association effect', 'attentional cost' or 
'switch cost' can refer to either RT costs or error costs interchangeably. As such researchers 
tend to assume that both reflect the same underlying mechanisms, and whether to use error or 
RT costs is seen as a pragmatic choice rather than one with theoretical consequence. For 
some paradigms it is traditional to focus on one measure, for example RT costs in task 
switching or the IAT, but it is nevertheless expected that effects of interest will also be 
reflected in error rates (Draheim, Hicks, & Engle, 2016; Nosek, Bar-Anan, Sriram, Axt, & 
Greenwald, 2014).  
When moving from group effects to individual differences or group differences, the 
theoretical basis of many conclusions depends on the assumption that differences in 
performance costs reflect variance in processing ability in that cognitive domain. More able 
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participants should have smaller costs in both reaction time and errors, once speed-accuracy 
trades-offs are subtracted out. In other words, RT and error costs should correlate. Empirical 
studies and meta-analyses tend to draw upon both error costs and RT costs and use either to 
support the same conclusions. To take just two examples, if we dissect a recent meta-analysis 
of response control in autism spectrum disorders, which included 16 datasets from flanker, 
Simon and Stroop tasks (Geurts, van den Bergh, & Ruzzano, 2014), we find five showed 
effects for RT costs while three showed effects for error costs (see Supplementary Material 
A). Similarly, in a meta-analysis of 12 studies examining flanker and Simon effects in 
children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (Mullane, Corkum, Klein, & 
McLaughlin, 2009), three studies observed larger RT costs and two observed increased error 
costs. None of the datasets in either meta-analysis showed effects for RT costs and error costs 
simultaneously, hinting that the assumption of equivalence might not hold. 
Using performance costs (subtraction between conditions) has been so successful and 
ubiquitous in experimental research, that when moving to study individual differences, it is 
rarely questioned whether individual differences in RT costs or error costs primarily reflect 
processing ability, or whether they might in fact reflect other factors such as differences in 
strategy. When not using costs, but rather absolute accuracy or RT in tasks, it is appreciated 
that strategy, cautiousness and other factors may contaminate individual differences. For 
example, in numeracy tasks it has been illustrated how absent correlations between tasks can 
be explained by dissociating information processing and caution using a quantitative model 
(Ratcliff, Thompson, & McKoon, 2015). For most researchers, such complications with 
absolute RT or accuracy are exactly the reason why they subtract between conditions - the 
resulting cost score is supposed to be immune from contamination. 
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However, across the literature are many hints implying all is not well with the 
assumptions underlying correlational research with cognitive performance costs. Draheim et 
al. (2016) have recently questioned why RT task switch costs show inconsistent or no 
relationship with measures of working memory capacity even though theorists generally 
agree that working memory is implicated in task switching (c.f. Monsell, 2003). Similarly, it 
is often assumed that different response conflict tasks tap common underlying control 
mechanisms (c.f. Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Miyake et al., 2000), but correlations between 
tasks are often low or absent (Aichert et al., 2012; Fan, Flombaum, McCandliss, Thomas, & 
Posner, 2003; Khng & Lee, 2014; Scheres et al., 2004; Wager et al., 2005). For the IAT task, 
recent meta-analyses of the extent to which attitudes or behaviour can be predicted by task 
scores have reached mixed conclusions (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; 
Oswald, Mitchell, Blanton, Jaccard, & Tetlock, 2013; though see, Greenwald, Banaji, & 
Nosek, 2015). The absence of theoretically predicted relationships between supposedly 
related tasks is a challenge for these theories, and has led researchers to question the selection 
of measures. 
The contamination of RT costs by processes not specific to the domain of interest has 
been discussed previously (Faust et al., 1999; Miller and Ulrich, 2013). Miller and Ulrich 
propose a broad stage-based framework for individual differences in reaction time (IDRT), 
wherein RT arises from the sum of processing durations across perceptual input, response 
selection and motor output stages. Although this framework treats only RT and is agnostic 
about the mechanisms within these stages and the sources of general and specific variance in 
terms of psychological process, Miller and Ulrich highlight two important things for our 
discussion: RT costs are not a pure index of individual differences in the theoretical 
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mechanisms that they are frequently used to represent; and if variance between individuals 
arises from both task-specific and general processing factors, it can become difficult to 
interpret correlations. 
  In order to obtain a more complete representation of behavioural performance, some 
authors have used composite measures of RT and accuracy (Draheim et al., 2016; Hughes, 
Linck, Bowles, Koeth, & Bunting, 2014; Khng & Lee, 2014; Mullane et al., 2009; Stahl et 
al., 2014; Townsend & Ashby, 1978, 1983). However, such methods still generally assume 
that RT costs and error costs reflect the same mechanisms - at least in part - and thus will 
positively correlate.  In contrast, absent correlation between RT costs and error costs within 
the same Stroop task led Kane and Engle (2003) to suggest the two measures actually reflect 
different mechanisms (conflict resolution and goal maintenance). 
Overview of the paper 
In Part 1 of this paper, we perform a meta-analysis to test the widespread theoretical 
assumption underpinning the use of performance costs as indexes of ability in specific 
cognitive domains.  This assumption predicts a positive correlation between performance 
measures – error costs and RT costs –within the same task. This assumed correlation supplies 
an implicit justification to choose either measure on pragmatic grounds without theoretical 
consequence (or to combine them into a single metric). We test the correlation for 114 
experimental effects taken from 43 different studies, encompassing 13 prominent paradigms 
across experimental psychology, using both new data and reanalysis of previously published 
data from many labs (originally addressing many different questions). To anticipate, we find 
little or no correlation in the majority of cases; for example, an individual's Stroop effect 
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measured by errors is clearly not interchangeable with their Stroop effect measured by RT, 
and likewise for nearly all the other common effects we analyse. 
Should we be alarmed by this? From most theoretical standpoints, this general pattern 
seems surprising and potentially undermines the conclusions of many studies, reviews and 
meta-analyses. But from one family of theoretical perspectives is it not alarming, as we 
illustrate in Part 2 of the paper using four different models (Bompas & Sumner, 2011; Brown 
& Heathcote, 2008; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Ulrich, Schroter, Leuthold, & Birngruber, 
2015) drawn as exemplars from a wider family of models that employ an evidence 
accumulation framework (Bogacz, Usher, Zhang, & McClelland, 2007; Carpenter & Reddi, 
2001; Carpenter & Williams, 1995; Hübner, Steinhauser, & Lehle, 2010; Logan, Cowan, & 
Davis, 1984; Teodorescu & Usher, 2013; Usher & McClelland, 2001; White, Ratcliff, & 
Starns, 2011). It turns out that within this framework, absent or inconsistent correlation 
between RT costs and error costs should be expected. This theoretical prediction emerges 
from the same model features that explain why absolute accuracy and RT did not correlate in 
numeracy tasks (Ratcliff et al., 2015).  
The models capture individual differences in (at least) two distinct ways. The first 
corresponds to differences in accumulation rates (processing or selection efficiency). When 
individuals vary only in their selection efficiency, this produces a positive correlation 
between RT costs and error costs, as commonly assumed. The second corresponds to 
response threshold (caution), where differences would produce a negative correlation 
between error costs and RT costs. Note that since we are dealing with costs calculated 
through subtraction, not absolute RT and error rates, this negative correlation is not a simple 
speed-accuracy trade-off. However a key theoretical consequence of these models is that 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AND DECISION MODELS 
 10 
 
 
 
threshold and processing efficiency interact, and a subtraction between conditions does not 
control for caution differences between individuals.  
If participants vary in both accumulation rate (selection efficiency) and threshold, 
then an overall correlation between error and RT costs is not expected, despite both being 
outcomes of the same decision and control mechanisms. We illustrate that this is not a feature 
of any specific model, but a property the family shares. Thus the framework of accumulator 
models appears fruitful for understanding individual differences in performance on choice 
decision tasks.  
In Part 3 of the paper we test with new data two predictions arising from the 
modelling framework. First, reducing variance in response caution by emphasising speed (c.f. 
Ratcliff et al., 2015) should mean the correlation between RT costs and error costs becomes 
more positive. We test this with meta-analysis of recent unpublished studies using a speed-
accuracy trade-off design. Second, reducing the opportunity for participants to adopt strategic 
caution differences by randomly intermixing trial conditions within blocks should also lead to 
more positive correlations, compared to when trial conditions are performed in separate 
blocks, which allows more variability in strategy. We test this with new data directly 
comparing the same task with intermixed or blocked conditions. Both of these predictions 
were corroborated, leading us to accept the accumulation model family as a suitable 
theoretical framework for understanding individual differences in performance costs in 
cognitive tasks.  
Part 1. No consistent correlation between RT costs and error costs in cognitive tasks. 
Methods 
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Search strategy. We identified a list of widely used and cited speeded choice tasks 
for which performance can be measured with either RT costs or error costs (i.e a subtraction 
between two types of condition), and for which we were able to access at least one suitable 
dataset from open science resources, our own studies, or from colleagues.  
 We used the following strategies to search for relevant literature: (a) PsychInfo and 
Web of Science. Our search terms were any of the task names: ‘flanker’, ‘stroop’, ‘simon’, 
‘antisaccade’, ‘remote distractor’, ‘snarc’, ‘σavon’, ‘task-switch’, ‘implicit association test’, 
’attention network test’, and ‘lexical decision’; in combination with any of the terms: ‘RT 
cost’, ‘reaction time cost’, ‘error cost’, ‘accuracy cost’, ‘latency cost’, ‘cost’. We 
supplemented this search by manually searching Google and Google Scholar with the same 
terms, and scanning the reference lists of eligible articles. We included unpublished research 
dissertations in our search. (b) Then, we searched for additional datasets from which RT costs 
and error costs could be calculated. We searched within the Open Science Framework 
(https://osf.io/) for each task by name, as well as searching Google for “(task name) dataset”. 
We required datasets to have an associated article or preprint, in order to identify necessary 
study information. (c) A further 12 correlations from 8 different tasks were collected in our 
own lab. Six of these correlations come from a previously published paper (Hedge et al., 
2017), the others are unpublished data collected in part to address this question. The 
descriptions, and a figure summarising the format of these tasks is included in Supplementary 
Material B. (d) Data from 5 studies was made available to us by colleagues. See Table 1 for 
sample sizes and trial numbers. See Supplementary Material C for additional details on how 
the data were extracted. See Figure 1 for our PRISMA flow diagram (Moher et al., 2009).  
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Our inclusion criteria were that the study should either report the correlation between 
the RT cost and error cost, or the data should be made available such that we could calculate 
the correlation ourselves. For tasks that contained both a congruent and neutral condition, we 
use the congruent condition as a baseline, as we believed it to be more comparable to tasks 
that do not have a neutral condition (e.g. the IAT), and it is not always clear what constitutes 
a neutral stimulus (c.f. Jonides & Mack, 1984; MacLeod, 1991). We did not exclude studies 
on the basis of age or clinical conditions, though eligible datasets from samples other than 
healthy adults were rare. Though we focused our search on particular paradigms that are 
widely used in individual differences research, eligible datasets often included other common 
manipulations and effects that we did not explicitly search for (e.g. comparing single task 
blocks to mixed task blocks in task-switching studies). We calculated the correlation between 
RT costs and error costs for these manipulations where appropriate. Our search produced 114 
correlations in total (see Table 1). 
Where the raw trial by trial data were available (k=75, including our data), we applied 
a common pre-processing and outlier removal pipeline (see ‘Data analysis’ below). Where 
we only obtained summary data for each participant (k=25), the calculation of individual’s 
RT costs and error costs reflect the authors’ original outlier removal strategy. From each 
dataset, we extracted the sample size and trial number, which are reported in Table 1 along 
with each effect size. See Supplementary Table C1 for additional information for each study. 
Only five of these papers discussed the relationship between RT costs and error costs in any 
way, and we outline the content of such discussion in the discussion of part 1 and the general 
discussion. 
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*Insert Figure 1 about here* 
 
 Data analysis. Where studies involved data collection over multiple sessions, we 
collapsed across sessions if possible. In some cases (e.g. Saunders et al. 2015) some 
participants did not have data for all sessions so we entered the sessions separately. We 
combined data from different experiments within the same paper if the same protocol was 
replicated in multiple samples. The calculation of mean RTs excluded RTs below 100ms 
(75ms in eye movement tasks) and greater than three times each individual’s median absolute 
deviation from their median in each condition (Hampel, 1974; Leys, Ley, Klein, Bernard, & 
Licata, 2013). When only summary data were available, we removed individuals whose mean 
RTs were below 100ms or their average accuracy across conditions was below 60%.  
Effect sizes (Pearson’s R and Spearman’s Rho) were calculated for the correlation 
between RT costs and error costs for each effect. Initially, we used Pearson’s R estimates in 
the meta-analysis because they were more common in existing reports. We then re-ran the 
analysis using Spearman’s Rho estimates to minimise the impact of outliers in some datasets. 
In the conventional interpretation of these effect sizes, 0.1 is considered small, 0.3 is a 
medium effect size, and 0.5 is a large effect size (Cohen, 1988). 
Meta-analyses were conducted using Hedges and colleagues’ method assuming a 
random-effects model (Hedges & Olkin, 1985; Hedges & Vevea, 1998). We assessed 
heterogeneity using the I2 statistic, which estimates the variance of the true effect sizes as a 
percentage of total variance (including sampling error). I2 values of 25%, 50% and 75% are 
interpreted as low, moderate and high levels of heterogeneity respectively (Higgins, 
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Thompson, Deeks, & Altman, 2003). We also conducted a meta-regression analysis to assess 
whether effect size was moderated by the number of trials administered, which we centred on 
the mean. We did not include task/effect as a moderator due to the low number of datasets 
(sometimes 1) obtained for some, though we conducted a post-hoc sensitivity analysis to 
assess the impact of influential data points. All analyses were conducted using the metafor 
package (Viechtbauer, 2010) in R (R Core Team, 2016). 
Results and discussion 
 Table 1 shows the correlations between RT costs and error costs observed for each 
experimental effect, grouped by their source, along with sample size and trial numbers.  
 
 
*Insert Table 1 about here* 
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The meta-analysis using Pearson’s R coefficients (K = 114) indicated that overall 
there was a small correlation between RT costs and error costs (R = .17, 95% CIs: .13-.20, z 
= 8.54, p < .001), with a very high degree of between study heterogeneity (I2 = 99.9%). As 
can be seen in Figure 2, the observed Pearson’s R values ranged between -.45 and .78, with 
79% of the absolute values falling below what is typically considered to be a moderate effect 
size (.3; Cohen, 1988). Rerunning the analysis using Spearman’s Rho coefficients gave a 
slightly higher, but still small, estimate of the average effect (R = .19, 95% CIs: .16-.23, z = 
10.66, p < .001). Clearly individual differences in RT costs and error costs are not behaving 
as expected if they were interchangeable measures of the same cognitive processes.  
*Insert Figure 2 about here* 
 
Publication bias. To assess and control for potential biases, we conducted Egger’s 
test (Egger et al., 1997), followed by a trim and fill analysis (Duval & Tweedie; 2000a; 
2000b). Egger’s test assesses funnel plot asymmetry. When no bias exists the effects 
observed in individual studies should be symmetrically distributed around the average effect. 
Alternatively, a tendency for studies with small sample sizes to show stronger effects is 
typically interpreted as an indication of publication bias, as small studies with non-significant 
effects are less likely to be published. A trim and fill analysis corrects for funnel plot 
asymmetry by simulating “missing” studies to make the funnel plot symmetrical. Egger’s test 
indicated a significant asymmetry (z=-2.62, p=.009). Inspection of Figure 2 indicates that this 
is not driven by a trend for smaller samples to show larger effects, rather, it is influenced by 
their relative absence (the middle- and lower-right section of the plot is relatively sparse). 
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This is also influenced by the lexical decision task datasets, which had relatively large 
positive correlations and sample sizes. The trim and fill analysis simulated studies with 
positive correlations to correct for this asymmetry, though the corrected estimate was still 
small (R=.25).  
None of the published datasets we included were collected for the purpose of 
examining the correlation between RT costs and error costs, and it is unlikely that the size of 
that correlation formed any part of the publication decision process or the choice to make the 
datasets available (the correlation was not reported in most cases). Publication decisions in 
some studies would have depended on within-subject effects and hence favoured low 
between-participant variance (and thus lower possibility for correlation, see Hedge et al., 
2017; Miller & Ulrich, 2013; Paap & Sawi, 2016). However the original research questions 
across the 114 datasets were neither predominantly within-subject (favouring low variance) 
nor correlational (favouring high variance) by nature, so the datasets should not be 
systematically biased towards either high or low between subject variability.  
Trial number. Meta-regression analysis indicated that the number of trials 
administered significantly predicted the size of the effect, with more trials associated with 
larger effects (b = .00004, z = 5.12, p < .001). However, examination of Table 1 indicates that 
this may be strongly influenced by the lexical decision studies, which are arguably outliers in 
their trial numbers, and also produced the highest correlations (see discussion below). To 
assess this, we re-ran the meta-analysis and moderator analysis with the four lexical decision 
studies excluded. In the remaining datasets (K = 110), the average effect was R = .15 (95% 
CIs: .11-.18, z = 8.27, p < .001). A high degree of heterogeneity was again observed (I2 = 
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99.9%), though trial number no longer significantly predicted effect size (b = 0.00005, z = -
.32, p = .75). 
Specific task patterns. Though we did not conduct a formal moderator analysis for 
task, some trends are noteworthy from the examination of Table 1. The four lexical decision 
task datasets show a range of moderate to strong positive correlations (R = .34 to .78). One 
possible reason for this is the large number of trials used in these studies, which may serve to 
minimise measurement error that would otherwise attenuate correlations (Hedge et al., 2017; 
Paap & Sawi, 2016). Alternatively, it may reflect different patterns of behaviour produced by 
responses to words compared to non-words. Most of the tasks we examine consist of a 
comparison between relatively easy trials and relatively hard trials (e.g. congruent vs. 
incongruent, task repetitions vs. task switches). The latter are expected to produce longer RTs 
and an increased error rate. This is often not the case in the lexical decision task, where RTs 
are longer to non-words but error rates are comparable or lower than for words (see Keuleers 
et al., 2012; Table 2). Keuleers et al. suggest that high error rates to words may reflect other 
properties of the stimuli, for example, individuals may mistakenly identify low-frequency 
words as non-words. The correlations we report may be strongly influenced by individual 
differences in factors that influence this behaviour (for a recent discussion of nonword 
properties, see Yap et al., 2015). However, it is important to note that studies utilising the 
lexical decision task for individual differences often employ controls on confounding 
stimulus properties such as frequency. We would not conclude on the basis of the strong 
correlations in Table 1 that the lexical decision task is immune to the general issues raised by 
our analysis. 
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In the IDRT framework, Miller and Ulrich (2013) suggest that RT costs can be 
distinguished by whether they reflect common or opposing task-specific processes. In mental 
rotation, for example, rotating an object 180° draws upon the same mental process as rotating 
an object by 90°, but in a greater amount. In Stroop tasks, by contrast, reading automaticity is 
helpful in congruent conditions but unhelpful in incongruent conditions. RT costs derived 
from such opposing task-specific processes would be expected to have higher reliability, 
whereas RT costs derived from common-task specific processes would be expected to show 
stronger correlation with external measures. Most of the effects we include in our meta-
analysis rely on opposing-processes, though lexical decision effects could be interpreted to 
rely on common processes. Models of lexical decision performance often specify a serial 
search of the mental lexicon (e.g. Coltheart et al., 2001), where a word response is given if a 
matching entry is found, and a non-word response is given if no match is found by some 
point at which the search is terminated. Though Miller and Ulrich’s IDRT model does not 
address error costs, one could interpret the stronger correlations between RT costs and error 
costs in lexical decision as compatible with task-common processes. However, this 
extrapolation from Miller and Ulrich treats error costs as an ‘external measure’ just like RT 
costs in different tasks.  
The flanker task showed a wide range of correlations across seventeen datasets (R= -
.45 to .58). Notably, the two moderate negative correlations we observed in the flanker task 
were in Parkinson’s patients (R=-.39; Wylie et al., 2009) and older adults aged 65-80 years 
old respectively (R=-.45; Guye & Von Bastian, 2017). The latter correlation was influenced 
by an outlier, as indicated by the smaller Spearman’s correlation (Rho = -.08). Nevertheless, 
the same participants showed moderate positive correlations in the Simon (R=.38) and Stroop 
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(R=.46) tasks in Guye and Von Bastian’s study, suggesting that negative correlations are not 
a general consequence of particular samples. 
Reliability. How can the absence of a strong correlation between two indices of 
performance from the same task be reconciled with a (typically) robust effect on both metrics 
at a group level? One possibility is that the use of difference scores obscures a ‘true’ 
underlying relationship. For statistical reasons, difference scores typically show less reliable 
individual differences than their component measures, and this will attenuate the correlations 
between them and other variables (Cronbach & Furby, 1970; Lord, 1956; Spearman, 1910). 
Previous authors have noted that this may be a reason why different tasks do not correlate as 
well as often expected (Draheim et al., 2016;  Hedge et al., 2017; Khng & Lee, 2014; Miller 
& Ulrich, 2013; Paap & Sawi, 2016). The same issue would also affect the correlation 
between RT and error costs within tasks.  
However, as a sole explanation, poor reliabilities do not account for the low 
magnitude of the correlations that we observe. Psychometricians have suggested formulae 
that use the reliabilities of two measures to ‘disattenuate’ the observed correlation between 
them (Nunnally, 1970; Spearman, 1910). This procedure is intended to estimate what the 
relationship between two variables might be if not obscured by measurement error. For 
example, we previously found three-week re-test reliabilities ranging between .46 and .66 for 
Stroop and flanker effects (Hedge et al., 2017). Using these values would raise correlations of 
~.3 between error and RT costs to estimated disattenuated correlations of R~.5. Similar levels 
of reliability are reported for other tasks (e.g. an average of .5 for the IAT;Lane, Banaji, 
Nosek, & Greenwald, 2007), and most of our measured correlations were below .3. Thus 
most tasks would produce lower disattenuated esimates than .5. Although .5 is nominally 
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considered to be a strong correlation between two separate factors (Cohen, 1988), 75% of the 
variance in one measure is not accounted for by the other and in this case we are correlating 
two measures supposed to reflect the same thing. Therefore, the assumption that RT and error 
costs are interchangeable measures is not justified even if reliability could be accounted for in 
this way.  
Interim summary 
Overall then, our analysis illustrates that widely used and robust effects in RTs and 
their corresponding effects in errors show inconsistent, and often very little, correlation. This 
challenges the theoretical framework in which we traditionally interpret and assess cognitive 
differences. For example, how does one interpret a deficit in response inhibition that 
specifically affects RT costs but not error costs? The production of two uncorrelated 
measures from each task also increases the likelihood of false positives if not statistically 
controlled (John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012). This could be exacerbated by selective 
reporting in tasks where it is common to examine either RT or error costs without explicit 
justification for the choice.  
Only five studies discussed the correlation between RT and error costs. Two studies 
(Manoach et al. 2002; Cherkasova et al., 2002) report a negligible correlation in task 
switching in order to rule out the presence of a speed-accuracy trade-off. While the authors 
do not further interpret the absence of a positive correlation, the implication of their brief 
discussion is that they do not assume RT costs and error costs control for strategic changes. 
We return to the three other discussions for task switching (Draheim et al., 2016; Hughes et 
al. 2014) and the Stroop task (Kane & Engle, 2003) in the general discussion. First, in part 2, 
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we discuss how RTs and errors in cognitive tasks can be understood in the framework of 
evidence accumulation models. 
Part 2. Evidence accumulation models explain low correlations. 
Evidence accumulation models are a method of analysing and simulating RT and 
error rates in choice RT tasks, which have seen increasing use in recent years (for reviews 
and discussion, see Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, & Cohen, 2006; Donkin, Brown, 
Heathcote, & Wagenmakers, 2011; Forstmann, Ratcliff, & Wagenmakers, 2016; Forstmann 
& Wagenmakers, 2015; Forstmann, Wagenmakers, Eichele, Brown, & Serences, 2011; 
Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Ratcliff, Smith, Brown, & McKoon, 2016; Teodorescu & Usher, 
2013). The assumptions and architecture of these models vary, but all broadly assume an 
underlying process whereby evidence for the response alternatives is sampled sequentially 
over time, until a threshold is reached for one of the responses. A period of non-decision time 
is added to account for processes of stimulus encoding and motor initiation, but this part of 
the models is not relevant for our discussion here. These models are popular because their 
parameters can be linked to underlying cognitive and neurophysiological processes, and 
because they capture both error rates and RTs well in a unified framework. 
For illustration, we focus on four models here; the Drift-Diffusion Model (DDM; 
Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008), the Linear Ballistic Accumulator (LBA) model 
(Brown & Heathcote, 2008), the Diffusion Model for Conflict tasks (DMC; Ulrich et al., 
2015), and the Approximately Linear Rise to Threshold with Ergodic Rate (ALIGATER; 
Bompas & Sumner, 2011). There is ongoing debate about the precise nature of the modelled 
mechanisms and the assumptions each model makes in their implementation. This debate also 
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extends to models not covered in detail here (for discussions, see Carpenter & Reddi, 2001; 
Donkin, Brown, Heathcote, et al., 2011; Donkin, Heathcote, & Brown, 2009; Ratcliff, 2001; 
Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Teodorescu & Usher, 2013; for a diagramatic overview of the 
relationship between the models, see Ratcliff et al., 2016). The four models were chosen to 
encompass the range of tasks analysed in the first part of this paper, and because they 
represent different ways of implementing the mechanisms we are interested in.  
Schematics of the DDM and LBA can be seen in Figure 3. These models assume a 
constant average rate of evidence accumulation, or drift rate, within each trial. Both also 
typically assume that drift rates vary between trials, which produces variability in RTs and 
error rates. A key difference is that drift rates in the DDM are also subject to moment-to-
moment noise, which further contributes to variability in performance. In contrast, drift rates 
are linear in the LBA. A second key difference is that in the DDM, evidence for one response 
is direct evidence against the alternative, whereas in LBA the alternative responses have 
independent accumulators. Though they differ in their structure, both models successfully 
capture behavioural performance in many cognitive tasks, and broadly lead to the same 
conclusions about underlying psychological processes (for discussions of issues of 
complexity and model mimicry, see; Carpenter & Reddi, 2001; Donkin, Brown, Heathcote, et 
al., 2011; Donkin, Heathcote, et al., 2009; Ratcliff, 2001). The DDM has been employed to 
explain why individual differences in absolute RT and accuracy did not correlate in numeracy 
tasks (Ratcliff et al., 2015) and our illustrations below for RT costs and error costs emerge 
from the same fundamental model properties.  
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*insert Figure 3 about here* 
 
Though the DDM and LBA have been applied to a wide range of tasks, the 
assumption of constant average drift rate is problematic for many tasks in table 1, such as the 
flanker, antisaccade and Simon, where errors occur mostly on incongruent trials and tend to 
have short reaction times (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992; Ridderinkhof, 2002). Errors 
produced by DDM and LBA are normally slow, and although fast errors can be simulated if 
accumulation start point is given high variability (Heathcote & Love, 2012; Ratcliff & 
Rouder, 1998), this produces errors on congruent trials as well, since starting point 
parameters should not vary between intermixed conditions.  
Fast errors for incongruent stimuli are taken as evidence for initial automatic 
activation favouring the prepotent response, which is then inhibited or filtered out on correct 
trials (Ridderinkhof, 2002; Ridderinkhof, Van den Wildenberg, Wijnen, & Burle, 2004). To 
capture such dynamics, extensions of the general models have been suggested, such as the 
DMC and ALIGATER (Figure 4). The DMC is an extension of the DDM, in which the 
accumulation rate on each trial combines the normal linear process and a short-lived initial 
activation for the pre-potent response option. ALIGATER is an extension of the LBA and 
Carpenter and Williams’ (1995) LATER model (Linear Approach to Threshold with Ergodic 
Rate). LATER is similar to the LBA, in that it consists of a linear ballistic rise to threshold. 
ALIGATER (Approximately Linear Rise to Threshold with Ergodic Rate) extends this by 
including two types of inhibition: lateral inhibition between accumulators (c.f. Usher & 
McClelland, 2001) and late-starting reactive inhibition to inhibit the incorrect response 
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accumulator. Several other model variants have been proposed and these broadly produce 
similar patterns of data to the models selected here (see e.g. Dillon et al., 2015; Hübner et al., 
2010; Noorani & Carpenter, 2013; Usher & McClelland, 2001; White et al., 2011).  
 
*insert Figure 4 about here* 
 
Response selection and response caution in the decision model framework. 
In the decision portion of all of the models outlined above, there are two general 
factors that influence the nature and the speed of the response. The first is the strength of the 
evidence or the rate at which the accumulation processes differentiate between correct and 
incorrect options. This corresponds to the drift rate in DDM, the composite drift rate in DMC, 
the difference between accumulators’ rates in LBA, and the net effects of accumulation rate, 
mutual inhibition and reactive inhibition in ALIGATER.  This net rate of differentiation can 
be characterised as processing efficiency or selection. Differentiation rate clearly changes 
with the nature of the stimuli: for example, evidence for the ‘left’ response can be more 
quickly extracted from the flanker congruent stimuli <<<<< than from the incongruent 
stimuli >><>>.  
In most individual differences research, ‘processing efficiency’ maps onto the main 
construct of interest: the ability to rapidly select the appropriate answer, or the extent to 
which correct selection is impeded by irrelevant information or prepotent responses. In DDM 
this would be reflected by different mean drift rates between individuals, in LBA by a larger 
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or smaller difference in accumulation rate for correct and incorrect responses, in DMC by 
different amplitude in the transient component of drift, and in ALIGATER by reactive 
inhibition (because this model does not typically include goal-directed bias in underlying 
accumulation rates for each response option).  
The second factor affecting decision speed is how much evidence is required before a 
decision is made; the threshold or boundary, which has also been described as ‘response 
caution’ (Donkin, Brown, Heathcote, et al., 2011). The height of the threshold is thought to 
be partially under the individual’s control (Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998). In the speed-accuracy 
trade-off paradigm (Garrett, 1922; Hale, 1969; Wickelgren, 1977; Woodworth, 1899), 
participants are assumed to set their threshold lower under speed instructions, creating faster 
responses with a higher risk of errors due to noise or the pre-potent signal. Though thresholds 
can be strategically adjusted, we also assume that individuals vary on their ‘default’ level 
(Ratcliff et al., 2015). Differences in response caution have been shown to account for group 
differences that were previously attributed to deficits in processing, for example, in the aging 
literature (Ratcliff, Thapar, Gomez, & McKoon, 2004; Ratcliff, Thapar, & McKoon, 2006).  
Note that models can allow different thresholds for each response, reflecting a bias 
towards one choice when it is incentivised or more frequent, for example. However, in 
situations where trials and responses are randomised, unpredictable and equally motivated, no 
bias is typically assumed, and this is what we assume here. 
Subtracting performance in a baseline condition does not control for caution.  
The potential contribution of caution to differences in absolute RT and accuracy 
(Ratcliff et al., 2015; Thompson, Ratcliff, & McKoon, 2016) is one of the key reasons why 
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many tasks employ a within-subject subtraction between conditions (i.e. the RT cost or error 
cost). It is commonly assumed that such subtraction controls for speed accuracy trade-offs, 
but in accumulation models it does not (see also Ratcliff, Spieler, & McKoon, 2000; White, 
Curl, & Sloane, 2016). This is in essence the most important difference between the 
accumulation model framework and traditional conceptualisations of these tasks. In the 
models, individual differences in threshold will contaminate (or be part of the interesting 
variance in) RT costs and error costs when attempting to measure individual differences in 
selection or any other aspect of task performance. Higher levels of selection efficiency lead to 
both smaller RT costs and smaller error costs. In contrast, higher levels of response caution 
lead to larger RT costs and smaller error costs. The mechanisms of this are illustrated for the 
drift diffusion model in Figure 5 (see Supplementary Material D for other models).  
 
*insert Figure 5 about here* 
 
Simulated examples. 
To illustrate the effects of individual variation in response caution and selection 
efficiency, we simulated the patterns of RT costs and error costs produced by the DDM, the 
LBA, the DMC, and ALIGATER. Each simulation consisted of 50,000 trials per condition. 
The ranges of parameters used in our simulations were informed by previous simulations 
using these models where available, as well as our own simulations. For brevity, we use the 
terms ‘congruent’ and ‘incongruent’ to refer to all tasks, thus encompassing 
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congruent/baseline/target/valid and incongruent/alternate/distractor/invalid conditions 
respectively. The general results of our simulations are not dependent on the choice of either 
a congruent or neutral condition as a baseline (c.f. Jonides & Mack, 1984), as the difference 
between conditions in both cases would typically be captured by differences in processing 
efficiency.  
 Drift-Diffusion Model (DDM). In this model, basic congruency effects are captured 
by differences between mean drift rates for congruent and incongruent trials (v1, v2). To 
simulate individual differences in caution, we let boundary separation (a) vary between 0.07 
and 0.16 in increments of 0.015. To simulate individual differences in selection efficiency, 
mean drift rates for incongruent trials varied from 0.1 to 0.4 in increments of 0.05 (while 
mean drift rates for congruent trials were constant at 0.45). Parameters describing between-
trial variability in drift rates (η), mean start point bias (z), and within trial-noise (s) were held 
constant across simulations (see Table 2 for values used). The drift-diffusion model was 
simulated using the DMAT toolbox (Vandekerckhove & Tuerlinckx, 2008) in Matlab 2014a 
(The MathWorks Inc., USA). Parameter ranges were informed by Donkin, Brown, Heathcote 
and Wagenmakers (2011). 
Linear ballistic accumulator model (LBA). In this model, congruency effects are 
captured by differences between mean drift rates on congruent and incongruent trials (v1, 
v2). To simulate individual differences in caution, we varied the response boundary 
parameter (b) from 250 to 600 in increments of 50. To simulate individual differences in 
response selection, mean drift rates for incongruent trials varied between 0.95 and 0.65 in 
increments of 0.05 (mean drift rates for the correct response accumulator on congruent trials 
were fixed to 1). The drift rates for the incorrect response accumulators were fixed to 1 minus 
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the drift rate for the correct response. Parameters describing start point variability (A) and 
between trial variability in drift rates (s) were held constant for all simulations (see Table 2). 
The LBA model was simulated using code provided in R (Donkin, Averell, Brown, & 
Heathcote, 2009; Donkin, Brown, & Heathcote, 2011), using parameter ranges derived from 
Donkin et al. (2011). 
Diffusion model for conflict tasks (DMC).  In this model, congruency effects are 
captured by the amplitude of automatic activation (A for congruent trials, 0-A for incongruent 
trials). To simulate differences in caution, we varied boundary separation (b) between 35 and 
65 in increments of 5. To simulate differences in selection efficiency, we varied the 
amplitude of automatic activation between 10 and 28 in increments of 3. Parameters 
describing the drift rate for the controlled process (µc), time to peak automatic activation (Ĳ), 
the shape parameter of the starting point distribution (α), the shape parameter of the 
automatic activation function (a), and within-trial noise (ı) were fixed for all simulations (see 
Table 2). The DMC (Ulrich et al., 2015) was implemented in Matlab, using parameter ranges 
reported by Ulrich et al., as well as informed by our own simulations. 
Approximately Linear Inhibition-Governed Approach to Threshold with Ergodic 
Rate (ALIGATER). In ALIGATER, congruency effects are captured by mutual inhibition 
and reactive inhibition that selectively inhibits the accumulator for the incorrect response on 
incongruent trials. Congruent trials consist of a single accumulator with a linear rise to 
threshold, making the model in these trials equivalent to LATER (Carpenter & Williams, 
1995) or LBA without start-point variability. Drift rate for the single accumulator in 
congruent trials, and for the correct and error accumulators in incongruent trials, are fixed to 
the same value. To simulate differences in caution, we varied the threshold (Th) between 0.7 
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and 1.3 in increments of 0.1. To simulate differences in selection efficiency, we varied the 
strength of reactive (endogenous) inhibition (Iendo) from 0.01 to 0.022 in increments of .002. 
Parameters describing the mean drift rates (µc, µi), between trial variability in rise rates (η), 
reactive inhibition delay (δendo), mutual inhibition strength (w) and mutual inhibition delay 
(δw), were fixed across all simulations (see Table 2). ALIGATER (Bompas & Sumner, 2011) 
was implemented in Matlab, with parameter ranges informed by Bompas and Sumner, as well 
as our own simulations. 
 
*Insert Table 2 about here* 
 
Simulation results. The relationships between RT cost and error cost from the 
simulated data are shown in Figure 6. The first column shows the effect of variations in 
selection efficiency and caution (as conceptualised by each model) on error costs from each 
model. The second column shows the corresponding effects on RT costs. The third column 
shows the expected correlation between RT costs and error costs as either caution or selection 
varies between individuals. For example, the grey line and circle markers in the top right 
panel shows the effect of varying incongruent drift rates (selection efficiency) in the drift 
diffusion model while holding boundary separation constant is a positive correlation. These 
are the data points highlighted by circle markers in columns one and two (note that individual 
points also keep their colours when replotted in column three). The purple line in the top right 
panel shows the effect of varying boundary (threshold) separation while holding drift rates 
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constant is a negative correlation (drawn from the purple data points marked by crosses in 
columns one and two). 
 
*Insert Figure 6 about here* 
 
The critical point to be taken from Figure 6 is that all of the models can account for 
positive, negative or absent correlations between RT costs and error costs, depending on 
whether variance in selection efficiency or in caution dominates (and the ranges of that 
variance), or whether both vary such that no overall correlation appears. In practice, variance 
in both caution and selection efficiency is expected in all studies, and the extent to which one 
or the other dominates may be influenced by population, sampling variance, task, or task 
instructions (see Part 3). As such, the data in Table 1 is to be expected in this framework. 
This conclusion is independent of the specific model used. 
Though all the models produce similar behaviour with respect to the patterns of RT 
and error costs there are notable differences between models worth explaining. First, as noted 
when introducing the models, errors are typically fast for ALIGATER and the DMC, while 
errors tend to be relatively slow in the DDM and LBA. Second, the data are non-linear to 
different degrees. For example the strong non-linearity in ALIGATER occurs partly because 
the cost of successfully saving a would-be error is to produce a relatively long correct RT. On 
a trial with an initially strong level of distractor activation, an individual with low response 
selection efficiency will make an error. In contrast, an individual with higher levels of 
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response selection efficiency may save the error, but this correct response will be slow due to 
mutual inhibition from the distractor. Thus despite high selection efficiency, slow RTs get 
added to this individuals RT distribution that are absent for the individual with low selection 
efficiency. Analogous behaviour can occur in other models. For example, individuals with 
higher drift rates in the DDM and LBA are less likely to make errors on trials where start 
point variation favours the error response, though these trials will produce relatively long RTs 
(c.f. Ratcliff and Rouder, 1998). However, as the average drift rates typically differ between 
conditions in the LBA and DDM, this behaviour has less of an influence on the overall RT 
distribution. 
Alternative sources of slowing and errors within the models  
Our simulations focus on the dimensions of response selection and response caution, 
as they are implemented across many evidence accumulation models. As shown above, these 
two concepts are sufficient to explain the results of the meta-analysis. However, other 
parameters in the models also influence reaction times and error rates. We conduct additional 
simulations in Supplementary Material G to illustrate these relationships, and we give an 
overview of commonly discussed parameters below. For the interested reader, we also 
examine the influence of varying the time-to-peak parameter in the diffusion model for 
conflict tasks in Supplementary Material G. 
Average drift rates or general processing efficiency. We characterise response 
selection as the difference between evidence accumulation rates in two conditions. This 
represents an individual’s ability in a particular cognitive domain, for example, in the Stroop 
task. For two individuals with equivalent drift rates for congruent stimuli, an individual with 
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low selection ability will show lower drift rates for incongruent stimuli relative to an 
individual with high selection ability. In reality individuals are also likely to vary in their 
general ability to process information, such that drift rates to congruent and incongruent 
stimuli would be correlated. The impact of this is that an individual with a lower average drift 
rate will show larger RT costs and error costs relative to an individual with a higher average 
drift rate even if they have the same response selection ability (i.e. relative difference 
between drift rates). This would create correlation between measures. In other words, general 
slowing can ‘look like’ domain specific deficits in traditional measures. 
This also means that traditional analyses of RT costs are difficult to interpret when 
comparing populations with different mean RTs (see also Faust et al., 1999). But if we 
assume accumulation models are a meaningful framework, and one has sufficient data to 
estimate the parameters, individual differences in average processing rates are not distinctly 
problematic. Drift rates are typically freely estimated for each condition, such that one can 
formulate hypotheses about the difference between drift rates without confounding or 
constraining average drift rates.  
Non-decision time. Non-decision time reflects the total duration of perceptual and 
motor processes, which often represent a sizeable proportion of RTs. Individual differences in 
non-decision time are therefore highly relevant to attempts to link individual differences in 
mean RT to constructs such as general intelligence (e.g. Der & Deary, 2017) or mental health 
(e.g. Gale, Harris & Deary, 2016; see also Miller & Ulrich, 2013). In most of the paradigms 
we discuss it is common to assume that non-decision time does not vary between conditions. 
This reflects an assumption that, for example, early visual processes do not take longer for an 
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incongruent flanker stimulus (<<><<) relative to a congruent stimulus (<<<<<). This 
simplifying assumption is also made in other models of RT (e.g. Miller and Ulrich, 2013).  
As increasing non-decision time is assumed to slow RTs in both conditions equally it 
would not affect the RT cost. It is also assumed the non-decisional processes do not affect 
accuracy, so it would not affect the correlation between RT costs and error costs. However, 
the assumption very much a simplification, and depends on the definition of what is visual 
processing and what is goal-directed information accumulation. Indeed, this distinction has 
no clear mapping onto visual information flow through the brain, which is sensitive to 
attention/relevance from the earliest stages. There are some paradigms where differences in 
non-decision time between conditions have been explicitly implicated (e.g. masked vs. 
unmasked priming; Gomez, Pera and Ractliff, 2013). In these cases, variation in non-decision 
time in the slower condition would affect the size of the RT cost without affecting the error 
cost, diminishing the correlation between RT costs and error costs.  
Variation in starting points. Another common simplifying assumption in the DDM 
is to constrain the starting point of the accumulation process to be equidistant between the 
two response boundaries on every trial. This assumption is typically not made in the LBA, 
where starting point variability contributes to variation in RTs in the absence of within-trial 
(diffusion) noise. Starting point variability is often invoked to account for fast errors, which 
would be likely if the accumulation process sometimes begins close to the boundary for the 
incorrect response (Heathcote & Love, 2012; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Ratcliff & Tuerlinckx, 
2002). This entails that on some trials the accumulation process begins close to the boundary 
for the correct response, such that a fast correct response is given. As such, it impacts on the 
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RT and error rate of both conditions. Our simulations in Supplementary material G indicate 
that it has relatively little impact on the RT cost and error cost. 
Part 3: testing predictions of the accumulation model framework 
Prediction 1: Speed instructions increase correlation between RT costs and error costs 
 In our simulations, variation in response caution led to negative correlations between 
RT and error costs, whereas variation in selection efficiency led to more positive correlations. 
Therefore, the model framework predicts that reducing variability in response caution - and 
thus increasing the proportion of variance accounted for by selection efficiency - would lead 
to more positive correlations.  
In their examination of the relationship between average accuracy and average RT in 
numerical cognition, Ratcliff et al. (2015) reasoned that, if levels of response caution are 
flexible, then emphasising speed in their instructions should reduce variance in response 
caution relative to encouraging participants to be both fast and accurate (which is often the 
standard task instruction). If we apply the same logic to the examination of RT and error 
costs, then we should observe that the correlation between costs is more positive under speed 
instructions than under standard task instructions. To test this prediction, we draw upon data 
from two studies recently conducted in our lab for the purpose of examining the reliability 
and generality of adjustments to caution. In the first study, participants completed the flanker 
and Stroop tasks in two sessions. In the second, participants completed the flanker and a 
random-dot motion discrimination task in a single session. Both studies consisted of speed, 
accuracy, and both speed and accuracy (standard) instruction conditions. Here, we examine 
whether the correlation between RT and error costs is higher under speed instructions relative 
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to standard instructions. We also report the correlations under accuracy instructions for 
completeness, but this was not directly compared to the other conditions (see below). 
 Detailed methods for these experiments are in Supplementary material E. For brevity, 
we give an overview here. In the first study, 57 participants performed both the flanker and a 
manual Stroop task in two sessions taking place 4 weeks apart. In the second study, 81 
participants performed the flanker task and a random dot motion discrimination task in a 
single session. At the beginning of speed-emphasis blocks, participants were asked to “Please 
try to respond as quickly as possible, without guessing the response”. For accuracy blocks, 
participants were told “Please ensure that your responses are accurate, without losing too 
much speed”. For standard instruction blocks, participants were instructed “Please try to be 
both fast and accurate in your responses”. Feedback was also manipulated to encourage speed 
and/or accuracy in accordance with the instructions.  
 Data analysis. The same inclusion criteria and RT cut-offs described in Part 1 were 
applied; the number of participants included in the analysis for each task, session and study is 
shown in Table 3. 
 To test whether the correlation between RT and error costs is more positive under 
speed instructions relative to standard instructions, we adopted a meta-analytic approach. 
First, for each dataset, we calculated the Pearson correlation between the RT costs and error 
costs in speed and standard instruction conditions separately. We then applied the Fisher’s z-
transform (Fisher, 1914) to the coefficients, and transformed these back into R values. 
Treating the differences in R values between instructions as the effects of interest, we then 
calculated a weighted average effect using Hedges and colleagues’ method assuming a 
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random-effects model (Field & Gillett, 2010; Hedges & Olkin, 1985; Hedges & Vevea, 
1998). Note that more complex methods could take into account the nested structure of our 
data, but we opt for the simpler approach given the small number of datasets.  
Results and discussion 
We limit our coverage of the results to the correlations between RT and error costs. 
Table 3 summarises the correlations in each condition, and the difference between the 
correlations in the standard and speed-instruction conditions. We report the correlation under 
accuracy instructions for completeness, though following Ratcliff et al. (2015), we restrict 
our analysis to the comparison of speed emphasis to standard instructions. The weighted 
average effect size was R= .19 (95% CIs: .09-.29, z=3.57, p<.001), indicating that the 
correlation between RT and error cost is indeed more positive under speed instructions. Note 
that this effect was fairly consistent, with none of the datasets showing a more positive 
correlation under standard instructions. This is consistent with the accumulation model 
framework.  
 
*Insert Table 3 about here* 
 
The size of the effect that we observe (.19) is small by commonly used criteria 
(Cohen, 1988), though we consider it to be meaningful given that the unweighted average 
correlation under standard instructions in Table 3 was R= .17 (note that this is similar to the 
average of R=.17 observed in Table 1). Nevertheless, at R=.36, the average correlation under 
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speed instructions was still far from unity. While speed instructions may lessen the impact of 
variation in response caution, RT and error costs cannot be considered interchangeable.  
The enhanced correlations under speed instructions do not arise simply from 
expanding the variance of the constituent variables; the standard deviation of the RT cost 
decreased from 30ms to 18ms on average, while it increased from 5% to 7% for the error cost 
(see Supplementary Material E). Note that while our hypothesis was derived from comparing 
speed to standard instructions as in Ratcliff et al. (2015), performance under standard 
instructions is often similar to that under accuracy instructions, such that theorists have 
suggested that the typical default strategy is to minimise errors (Forstmann et al., 2008; van 
Maanen et al., 2011; van Veen, Krug, & Carter, 2008). There is inconsistent evidence for this 
in Table 3, but it is not our focus here. 
 In our logic we assumed that speed instructions both lower thresholds (response 
caution) and reduce its variance across participants (see Ratcliff et al., 2015). That is not to 
say that threshold is the only parameter affected by speed-accuracy trade-offs. Several studies 
suggest that speed instructions may additionally lower drift rates and reduce non-decision 
time (e.g. Rae et al., 2014; though see Arnold, Bröder & Bayern, 2015; Starns & Ratcliff, 
2014). A reduction in non-decision time should not affect the correlation between RT costs 
and error costs assuming that it affects both congruent and incongruent conditions equally. A 
reduction in drift rates with an accompanying increase in drift rate variance would 
additionally shift the proportion of variance from threshold to drift rate and might be a factor 
behind the increased correlation.  
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AND DECISION MODELS 
 38 
 
 
 
One might also ask whether these findings are consistent with alternative models of 
the speed-accuracy trade-off. Two prominent explanations are the fast-guess model (Ollman, 
1966; 1970) and the deadline model (Yellot, 1971). The fast-guess model assumes that on 
some proportion of trials participants do not process the stimulus and instead make a fast 
guess with a short RT and chance accuracy. This proportion increases under speed 
instructions. In contrast, the deadline model contains late guesses, whereby participants 
respond with chance accuracy if a stimulus has not been categorised before some internal cut-
off. The deadline model assumes that participants reduce this time limit under speed 
instructions.  
Both models have fallen out of favour in recent years due to their inability to capture 
data from a range of speed-accuracy experiments (see Heitz, 2014 for a review). 
Nevertheless, we include simulations of predictions from both models in supplementary 
material I. Briefly, increased correlation between RT costs and error costs under speed 
emphasis is compatible with a deadline model.  Reduced deadline variance acts like reduced 
threshold variance, limiting the ability of participants to trade errors for longer RTs in the 
more difficult condition. A fast guess account does not predict a more positive correlation, as 
an equal number of fast guesses are added to both conditions irrespective of their difficulty.  
Prediction 2: Intermixed conditions increase correlation between RT costs and error 
costs 
A second prediction of the framework is that tasks with intermixed trial conditions 
should produce more positive correlations than blocked conditions in the same task. Again, 
this prediction arises from reducing the contribution of threshold variance to performance 
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variance. Accumulation models generally assume that boundary cannot be changed midway 
through a trial – and thus unpredictably intermixing trials forces participants to have the same 
boundary for every trial. On the other hand, explicitly blocking different conditions allows 
participants more freedom in adopting different levels of caution. The introduction of more 
freedom translates into more variance between participants. 
Anecdotal support for this hypothesis can be found in Table 1, with negative 
correlations observed in the Navon global precedence and antisaccade tasks, which used 
blocked conditions. Blocked designs are common in these tasks, where intermixed trials 
would introduce a rule switching component (blocked designs also occur in IAT tasks, but 
here participants would not be aware of the blocked arrangement, so the prediction does not 
apply). To test this prediction, we ran a new study (N=102) using the Simon task. In the same 
subjects, we compared the correlation between RT costs and error costs when trials are 
randomly intermixed (as is typical with the Simon task), compared to blocks of congruent 
and incongruent trials administered separately (as is common with the antisaccade task, for 
example). We predicted that the correlation between RT and error costs would be more 
positive in intermixed trials. Detailed methods are reported in Supplementary material F.  
Results and discussion 
 The correlations between RT and error cost measures can be seen in Table 4, along 
with the descriptive statistics. Spearman’s correlations are reported due to the presence of an 
outlier in the blocked condition. The correlations between RT and error costs within blocked 
and mixed version of the task are highlighted. 
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 As predicted, a modified Pearson-Filon test (Raghunathan, Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1996) 
showed that the correlation between RT and error costs for mixed trials (Rho=.61) was 
significantly more positive than that for blocked trials (Rho=-.20), Z=6.49, p<.001. Note that 
both were significantly different from zero, with a significant negative correlation observed 
in blocked trials.  
 
*insert Table 4 about here* 
 
Note that the overall error rates and RTs were larger for mixed trials (Congruent: 
7.9%, 408ms, Incongruent: 11.2%, 429ms) compared to blocked trials (Congruent: 3.2%, 
308ms, Incongruent: 6.8%, 353ms), while RT costs and variance in the RT costs was greater 
for blocked trials. Therefore, the higher correlation in mixed trials does not arise simply from 
an increase in variance. This pattern is consistent with participants decreasing their caution 
(to a variable extent) when they anticipate there will be no difficult trials. The degree to 
which they do this then drives the correlation between error costs and RT costs. In contrast, 
where trials are intermixed within blocks, caution cannot be adjusted between trial types, and 
the correlation between RT costs and error costs are driven more by variation in response 
selection.  
A second notable observation from Table 4 is that neither RT costs nor error costs 
from the blocked trials correlate significantly with their counterparts from mixed trial blocks. 
This is highly problematic from the theoretical standpoint that performance in the Simon task 
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simply reflects ability to inhibit a prepotent response. However, it is to be expected if 
variation in the costs derived from the blocked format are driven more by individual 
differences in response caution, whereas differences in response selection are more influential 
in mixed blocks. Note that this could also explain absent correlations between tasks thought 
to measure the same cognitive ability, but that differ in their blocking structure (such as 
between antisaccade and flanker paradigms for example).  
 
General Discussion 
As psychologists explore what Cronbach (1957) called the ‘outer darkness’ of error 
variance, it is becoming clear that the relationship between individual differences and 
experimental research is not always straightforward. Between-subject variance can arise from 
different mechanisms to within-subject variance (Borsboom, Kievit, Cervone, & Hood, 2009; 
Boy & Sumner, 2014), and the average behaviour of a group can misrepresent underlying 
patterns of individuals’ responses (Liew, Howe, & Little, 2016). Here, we demonstrate 
another counterintuitive finding across psychological paradigms. It is often assumed that 
subtracting between conditions controls for factors such as speed-accuracy trade-offs. In turn 
this leads to the widespread assumption that variance between individuals in performance 
indexes cognitive ability (processing efficiency) in that domain. This is the underpinning of 
nearly all theory built on individual differences in such tasks – such as the relationships 
between cognitive domains or with psychiatric disorders. If this were true, alternate measures 
of performance from the same task should always correlate. Our meta-analysis shows this 
assumption does not hold across a wide range or tasks. 
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In the second part of this paper, we illustrated how subtractions do not control for 
threshold (caution) differences within the framework of decision models. In turn, this means 
such models predict that RT costs or error costs are rarely interchangeable as performance 
measures - they would only be strongly correlated when threshold variance is very low. 
Evidence accumulation models provide a theoretical framework across cognitive psychology 
and cognitive neuroscience (c.f., Forstmann & Wagenmakers, 2015; Forstmann et al., 2011; 
Ratcliff et al., 2016). They have been applied to a wide range of cognitive domains, including 
memory (Ratcliff, 1978), perceptual decision making (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Ratcliff & 
Rouder, 1998; Usher & McClelland, 2001), choice preference (Tsetsos, Usher, & Chater, 
2010), language (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Ratcliff, Gomez, & McKoon, 2004; 
Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Gomez, & McKoon, 2008), numeracy (Ratcliff et al., 2015; 
Thompson et al., 2016) and response control (Gomez, Perea, & Ratcliff, 2007; Ulrich et al., 
2015; White et al., 2011). A strength of these models is that they can account for the patterns 
of behavioural speed and accuracy in conjunction (for a review, see Ratcliff et al., 2016). 
Increasingly, the models are now being used to understand group differences in clinical 
contexts (Metin et al., 2013; White, Ratcliff, Vasey, & McKoon, 2010; Zhang et al., 2016). 
Such an approach seems fruitful for correlational research (e.g. Ratcliff et al., 2015), given 
evidence presented here and elsewhere that thresholds (or speed-accuracy trade-offs) cannot 
be equated between individuals through instruction alone (Lohman, 1989; Ratcliff et al., 
2015; Wickelgren, 1977).  
Linking measures to mechanisms 
The decomposition of speeded decisions into (at least) two components does come at 
a cost of increasing the complexity of interpretations. However, this complexity may be a 
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necessity rather than a handicap. Theorists have noted that there is a tendency in the literature 
to attribute variation on a given task almost directly to variation in a single cognitive 
function, such as executive control, numeracy, or inhibition (Monsell & Driver, 2000; 
Ratcliff et al., 2015; Verbruggen, McLaren, & Chambers, 2014). Verbruggen et al. argue that 
this often results in a re-description of tasks or manipulations, rather than an explanation of 
the mechanisms underlying performance. Similarly, Ratcliff et al. (2015) argued that the 
absence of a theoretical model of decision making in numeracy judgements made accounting 
for inconsistent relationships between RT and accuracy measures problematic. Ratcliff et al. 
further proposed that the drift-diffusion model provided such a theory, within which 
performance on numerical tasks can be understood. Evidence accumulation models explicitly 
remind us that manipulations are rarely process-pure (Forstmann et al., 2016; Forstmann & 
Wagenmakers, 2015). As with any formal model, one can quantitatively test whether an 
experimental manipulation taps selectively into an underlying parameter of interest. Where a 
manipulation is not process pure, one can dissociate the effects on the underlying processes, 
for example, by examining differences in fitted drift rates rather than raw RT or error 
measures. 
We expand upon these recommendations in three key ways. First, we focus on the 
common practice of subtracting one condition from another, which is often assumed to 
control for differences in caution. Second, we demonstrate that inconsistent relationships 
between effects in RTs and effects in accuracy are widespread. These inconsistencies 
permeate domains of psychology that are at the forefront of initiatives focussed on 
understanding cognitive deficits in clinical conditions, such as executive control, attention 
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and response inhibition (e.g. Barch, Braver, Carter, Poldrack, & Robbins, 2009; Nuechterlein, 
Luck, Lustig, & Sarter, 2009).  
Third, we demonstrate that interpreting correlations between RT costs and error costs 
with respect to mechanisms of response selection and response caution is not specific to a 
given model. It has been noted that there is a high level of mimicry between the LBA and 
drift diffusion models, and that despite different architectures, often one would interpret 
effects with respect to the same underlying processes (Donkin, Brown, Heathcote, et al., 
2011). The DMC (Ulrich et al., 2015) and ALIGATER (Bompas & Sumner, 2011) models 
are non-linear departures from these general frameworks. The DMC and ALIGATER contain 
mechanisms such as transient excitation or inhibitory control, and produce different patterns 
of behaviour compared to the DDM and LBA. Nevertheless, in terms of the fundamental 
issue at stake here, parameters reflecting response caution and selection efficiency influence 
performance similarly across all these models.  
Decision models also allow for other mechanisms to be incorporated. For example, 
biases due to stimulus probabilities or incentives (e.g. Leite & Ratcliff, 2011) can be captured 
by relative starting point bias in the DDM, or equivalents in other models. However, while 
models may account well for phenomena at a behavioural level, they may not map directly on 
to functioning at a neurophysiological level (Heitz & Schall, 2012). Neurophysiological 
measures can provide useful tests of model assumptions (see e.g. Bompas, Sumner, 
Muthumumaraswamy, Singh, & Gilchrist, 2015; Burle, Spieser, Servant, & Hasbroucq, 2014; 
Servant, Montagnini, & Burle, 2014), and therefore may be useful in guiding and 
constraining cognitive models (Forstmann & Wagenmakers, 2015). 
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Response caution and the speed accuracy trade-off 
Considering speed and accuracy in conjunction has a long history in psychology in 
the context of the speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT; Garrett, 1922; Hick, 1952; Pachella, 1974; 
Wickelgren, 1977; Woodworth, 1899). Pachella noted that the assumption behind many RT 
measures, that RTs reflect the minimum duration required by participants to perform the task 
at maximum accuracy, is often untested and likely untrue. Wickelgren argued: “…the case 
for speed-accuracy tradeoff as against reaction time is so strong that this case needs to be 
presented as forcefully as possible to all cognitive psychologists” (p. 68). He went on to 
acknowledge that the requirement for additional trials over standard designs limited the 
appeal of trade-off designs, and noted that when considering mean differences between 
conditions: “When both errors and reaction times go in the ‘same’ direction, then it is 
reasonably safe to conclude that the condition which is slower and has more errors is more 
difficult than the condition that is faster and has fewer errors” (p. 79).  τur analysis 
demonstrates that establishing the same directionality of effects at the group level does not 
entail that both RT costs and error costs will rank individuals equivalently. Indeed, as we 
show in Part 3, a commonly used design practice (blocking conditions) can create a negative 
correlation between them. As such, researchers should not assume that RT costs and error 
costs derived from blocked methods predominantly reflect response selection mechanisms. 
We recommend that the correlation between RT and error costs be reported, and that explicit 
consideration be given where effects are examined/observed in one measure and not the 
other. 
 For many research questions, response caution might be considered a nuisance 
parameter that confounds the effect of interest. For example, if a researcher is interested in 
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individual differences in attention, then they are likely interested in the efficiency of 
information processing, either on average or with respect to some stimulus manipulation. 
This is the very logic behind subtracting between conditions, which was assumed to allow 
such processes to be examined in isolation. But caution is an interesting and fundamental 
component of decision-making. A wealth of literature exists examining the cognitive and 
neurological mechanisms underlying response caution, in both clinical and non-clinical 
populations (Dutilh, Forstmann, Vandekerckhove, & Wagenmakers, 2013; Dutilh et al., 
2012; Metin et al., 2013; Moustafa et al., 2015; Starns & Ratcliff, 2010, 2012; van Maanen et 
al., 2011; Zhang & Rowe, 2014). For some research areas, such as the study of impulsive 
behaviours, the extent to which individuals are willing to commit errors for the sake of faster 
RTs is of distinct theoretical interest. 
For decision models themselves, there is an ongoing debate whether caution is 
adequately captured by a simple threshold that does not vary within trials. For example, 
mechanisms by which the level of required evidence decreases over time have been proposed 
(Bowman, Kording, & Gottfried, 2012; Cisek, Puskas, & El-Murr, 2009; Ditterich, 2006; 
Drugowitsch, Moreno-Bote, Churchland, Shadlen, & Pouget, 2012; Thura, Beauregard-
Racine, Fradet, & Cisek, 2012). These proposals take the form of either a collapsing 
boundary, or an urgency signal that increases the rate of evidence accumulation. A recent 
review found that most human data was best accounted for with fixed thresholds, though 
evidence for dynamic thresholds was observed in nonhuman primates (Hawkins, Forstmann, 
Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, & Brown, 2015). In many (but not all) of the tasks we discuss, trials 
are typically randomly presented within blocks, and thus it is assumed that caution does not 
change between congruent and incongruent trials. Therefore, at a within-subject level, both 
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RT costs and error costs in response control tasks arise from differences in drift rates (or 
parameters that affect relative accumulation rate) between conditions. However, at a between 
subject level, the magnitude of an individual’s RT cost and error cost is a reflection of both 
their level of response caution and of response selection. 
Model similarities and differences 
 Our simulations cover only a selection of evidence accumulation models used in the 
literature, though most models implement mechanisms of response selection and response 
caution in comparable ways. For example, the Leaky Competing Accumulator (LCA; Usher 
& McClelland, 2001), implements response selection via a relative difference between the 
inputs (thus drift rates) in a similar approach to the DDM and LBA. The LCA also has a 
criterion parameter, which is equivalent to the implementation of response caution in the 
models simulated here. White et al. (2011) recently proposed a modified diffusion model of 
the flanker task, in which the drift rate varies over time according to a narrowing ‘attentional 
spotlight’. The shrinking spotlight, implemented as a Gaussian weighting centred on the 
central arrow and initially encompassing the flankers, allows the model to capture the fast 
errors typically observed in the flanker task. Though conceptually different, the resultant 
dynamics of the model are similar to the DMC, presented here. Therefore, our conclusions 
extend beyond the models featured in our simulations. 
 We selected four distinct models to illustrate common behaviour, not to emphasise 
any differences. It is also worth noting that some apparent differences between models are 
just different ways of achieving a similar goal. For example, ALIGATER contains an explicit 
selective inhibition mechanism, whereas inhibition is implicit in the DMC. Both amendments 
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to the basic models were introduced to ensure non-linear dynamics - that initial strong 
support for irrelevant information diminishes while support for relevant information is 
maintained. The DMC is thus compatible with an explicit mechanism of top-down inhibition 
(Ulrich et al., 2015). 
Some model differences reflect the task or modality in which the model is typically 
applied. For example, ALIGATER simulations assume equal mean initial rise rates for both 
target and distractor; an assumption also made by other models of eye movement tasks (e.g. 
Noorani & Carpenter, 2013), where accumulation is conceptualised as stimulus-driven. This 
assumption in turn creates the need for an additional mechanism to select target from 
distractor.  In contrast, the DDM, LBA and DMC implement a difference in the mean drift 
rates for correct and incorrect responses. This corresponds to conceptualising evidence 
accumulation at the level of relevant information for response selection, rather than direct 
sensory drive (c.f. Sternberg, 2001).  
The distinction between these models and their applications is not always clear cut, 
however (Carpenter & Reddi, 2001; Ratcliff, 2001), and neither do we believe the distinction 
between perception and response selection is clear cut in the brain. Processes such as 
attention act at multiple stages of processing, for example (Awh, Belopolsky & Theeuwes, 
2012). Further, not only the stimuli used, but also the requirements of information extraction 
across different task conditions will differentially draw on different visual pathways – all of 
which have different delay times (Bompas & Sumner, 2009; 2011)  
The assumptions made about perceptual (i.e. non-decision) processes have theoretical 
implications. For example, the distributional shape of non-decision time variability has 
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recently been questioned (Verdonck & Tuerlinckz, 2016). Whereas non-decision time is 
typically fixed, or assumed to follow a normal or uniform distribution, Verdonck & 
Tuerlinckz suggest that non-decision time may often be right-skewed. This misspecification 
can impact on the estimates of other parameters (e.g. individual differences in response 
caution).  
Even more counterintuitively for cognitive scientists, using different response 
modalities (e.g. hands, eyes or speech) changes the sensory part of non-decision time, with 
knock-on consequences for response selection phenomena (Bompas, Hedge & Sumner, 
2017). This is because different motor selection areas receive different connections from the 
various perceptual pathways. In turn, this provides an avenue for linking cognitive process 
models to neurophysiological models (e.g. Nunez et al., 2017). Though it is clear that there is 
much to be understood about the properties of decisional and non-decisional time, the pursuit 
of these questions is aided by theoretical frameworks within which to consider them. 
Alternative explanations - RT and error costs reflect different mechanisms? 
Absent correlation between RT costs and error costs in the Stroop task was previously 
noted by Kane and Engle (Kane & Engle, 2003), who attributed the two effects to different 
mechanisms. In line with the traditional account of Stroop interference, they argued that RT 
costs arose from the time taken for conflict resolution, but that errors arose from a failure of 
goal maintenance.  In a series of experiments, they manipulated the proportion of congruent 
trials in the Stroop task, and additionally measured participants’ working memory (WM) 
span. When the Stroop task was made up of 75% or 80% congruent trials, low WM span 
participants made a greater number of errors compared to high WM span participants. When 
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0% or 20% of trials were congruent, low WM span individuals did not make more errors, but 
showed increased RT costs. The authors argued that when the proportion of congruent trials 
was high, low WM span participants would sometimes fail to maintain the relevant task goal 
(naming the colour). The interpretation that errors reflect a failure of goal maintenance has 
been influential in interpreting differences in clinical groups, for example, where it has been 
observed that errors and error costs in the Stroop task are predictive of conversion to 
Alzheimer’s disease in older adults (Balota et al., 2010; Hutchison et al., 2010). 
These effects could also be described within a decision model framework, given that 
we would expect individuals to adopt different levels of caution in blocks of different 
congruency proportions (e.g. Part 3 above). A previous study examining the relationship 
between diffusion model parameters measured from choice RT tasks and a latent WM factor 
observed a positive correlation between WM and drift rate, and a negative correlation 
between WM and boundary separation (Schmiedek, Oberauer, Wilhelm, Suss, & Wittmann, 
2007). Thus individuals with a high WM may have high selection efficiency, and can set a 
relatively low threshold even when incongruent trials are frequent. In contrast, individuals 
with low WM span may have low selection efficiency, and would need to be more cautious 
when incongruent trials are frequent (increasing RT costs). More broadly, an interpretation 
that errors reflect attention lapses is compatible with decision model frameworks if one 
applies this interpretation to individual trials in which the drift rate is low (McVay & Kane, 
2013). 
Combining RT and error measures: alternatives to modelling 
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In the domain of task switching, the reliability and validity of the traditionally used 
RT costs has also been questioned (Draheim et al., 2016; Hughes et al., 2014). These 
discussions are based on the explicit assumption that speed-accuracy trade-offs can 
contaminate RT costs, which are traditionally used in task-switching, and may mask 
correlations with theoretically related constructs. In two experiments, Hughes et al. assessed 
three alternative scoring measures that combine effects in RT and accuracy into a single 
metric. The alternative scoring methods were: a rate residual scoring method (Was & Woltz, 
2007; Woltz & Was, 2006), a binning procedure, and Inverse Efficiency scores (IES; 
Townsend & Ashby, 1978, 1983). In Hughes et al.’s first comparison all three metrics 
showed similar reliability to the RT cost, with the error cost performing poorly. In 
Experiment 2, the alternative metrics were superior to the traditional measures. The authors 
argued that the rate residual and binning methods also showed increased validity because 
they showed larger associations with other executive functioning tasks than did the traditional 
measures. Other studies have also observed increased correlations between tasks when using 
the binning procedure (Draheim et al., 2016) or IES (Khng & Lee, 2014) compared to 
traditional scoring methods (see Vandierendonck, 2017 for a recent comparison of different 
composite measures). 
These methods are not without their criticisms, however. The use of residual scores as 
an alternative to difference scores have a long history (Cronbach, 1957; DuBois, 1957), 
though their practical advantages are not uniform, and their validity and interpretation has 
been questioned (for a review, see Willet, 1988). Potential inconsistencies and limitations of 
the binning method (Draheim et al., 2016) and the IES (Bruyer & Brysbaert, 2011) have also 
been discussed. As noted by Draheim et al., the binning method requires a somewhat 
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arbitrary decision about the extent to which errors are penalised relative to RTs. It has been 
argued that the IES should only be used where strong, positive correlations are observed in 
RTs and errors (Bruyer & Brysbaert, 2011; Townsend & Ashby, 1978, 1983), which our 
analysis illustrates is not usually the case.  
 Perhaps the largest advantage the decision model framework has over these 
alternative scoring methods is that the composite scores lack a theoretical justification for 
their respective methods of combing accuracy and RT into a single metric (Lohman & Ippel, 
1993; Rach, Diederich, & Colonius, 2011). Lohman and Ippel suggest that there are at least 
three types of errors – those due to ability, those due to the SAT, and those due to extraneous 
factors such as lapses of attention. Therefore, it may not be appropriate to treat all errors as 
equal for the purpose of combining them with RTs. In the decision model framework whether 
errors are fast or slow has important implications, and thus fitting takes into account not only 
the error rate but also the RT of each error. Further, increased correlations obtained from 
composite scores may in fact reflect commonalities in strategy (i.e. response caution) across 
different tasks, rather than the construct of interest. In summary, we see value in easy to 
calculate metrics that take both RT and error rates into account, however, we recommend 
caution in their interpretation in the absence of a specified theoretical framework. Decision 
models provide such a framework, within which we can account for error rates, as well as the 
RTs of both correct and incorrect responses. 
Relationship between models of response selection and other models of reaction time. 
 We have discussed the correlation between RT costs and error costs in the context of 
evidence accumulation models, though theorists have raised concerns about the interpretation 
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of RT measures outside of this framework (e.g. Faust et al., 1999; Miller & Ulrich, 2013; 
Sriram, Greenwald and Nosek, 2010). Further, theorists may not wish to commit to the 
assumptions underlying any particular formal model of the processes underlying RT and 
accuracy. The principles of evidence accumulation and threshold are compatible with general 
models of RT, however. Miller and Ulrich’s IDRT model proposes that an individual’s 
average RT and RT costs arise from processing across perceptual input, response selection 
and motor output stages. These stages correspond to the non-decision (perceptual + motor 
time) and decision components in models such as the DDM. Indeed, Miller & Ulrich note 
that the response selection stage could be realised as a diffusion or linear accumulation 
process, but their framework is agnostic to the nature of the processes underlying response 
selection.  
Where Miller & Ulrich’s work and ours overlap is that they note that an RT cost 
cannot be simply interpreted as an index of response selection ability, and that it is influenced 
by other properties such as general processing speed (as we discuss above). A similar point is 
made by Faust et al. (1999), who propose a rate and amount model (RAM) of reaction times. 
Here, again, the concepts of rate and amount are comparable to the accumulation of evidence 
to a threshold, though the RAM does not explicitly model these processes. Faust et al. 
propose a method for correcting RT costs for overall RT in the context of aging studies, 
where the issue of RT costs being positively correlated with average RT has been discussed 
frequently (Ratcliff et al., 2000; Salthouse, 1996; Verhaeghen, 2014). Again, they make the 
point that a raw RT cost cannot be simply interpreted as an index of ability in a given 
cognitive domain. 
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 While both the IDRT and RAM frameworks broadly capture how the latencies of 
different stages contribute to RT measures, they are agnostic to the nature of the cognitive 
processes underlying response selection. Further, they do not discuss the relationship between 
RT and accuracy. This is because both frameworks assume tasks are performed with minimal 
errors. Miller and Ulrich (2013) note that in order to consider the relationship with accuracy 
one needs an explicit model of response selection, such as those we discuss here (p. 844). 
More broadly, our discussion focuses on the assumption that individuals with higher levels of 
ability in a given domain should be both relatively faster and more accurate (see also Ratcliff, 
2015). The results of our meta-analysis in Part 1 are at odds with this assumption and theories 
of response selection provide one way in which these inconsistencies can be understood. 
Conclusions 
 In reflecting on the divide between individual differences and experimental research, 
Borsboom et al. (2009) suggest the two approaches are inevitably looking at different levels 
of explanation. At first glance, this appears to hold true for the data we discuss, where 
interpretations of behaviour at a within-subject level do not easily translate to interpreting 
between-subject variation. However, we believe that our findings show one way in which this 
‘outer darkness’ can be illuminated. The decision model framework allows the 
counterintuitive patterns of within- and between-subject variances to be reconciled. 
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Table 1. 
Pearson's R and Spearman's Rho correlations between reaction time costs and error costs in cognitive tasks. Unpublished data refer to data 
collected in our own laboratory, in part to address this topic. New analysis of published data refer to analyses conducted by us of published 
datasets that we were able to obtain (see methods). Previously reported correlations refer to correlations included in published papers, for 
which we conducted no additional analyses.  
  Study 
Task/effect N Trial N (baseline/alternate) Pearsons' R 
Spearman's 
rho 
Our data and 
unpublished 
data 
Hedge et al. (2017) Flanker (arrows) 104 480/480 0.28 0.27 
Stroop 103 480/480 0.27 0.29 
SNARC 40 640/640 0.20 0.20 
Navon – local conflict 40 320/320 0.41 0.32 
Navon – global conflict 40 320/320 -0.11 -0.06 
Navon – global precedence 40 320/320 -0.25 -0.23 
Hedge et al. (In prep) Flanker (arrows) 50 336/336 0.23 0.21 
Simon 50 336/336 0.47 0.54 
Other data Antisaccade 48 200|400/300|400† -0.13 -0.18 
Illogical rule task 44 200/200 -0.20 -0.12 
Distractor 48 200/200 0.38 0.30 
Antisaccade 21 400/400 -0.13 -0.15 
New analysis 
of published 
data 
Aichert et al. (2012) Antisaccade 502 60/60 0.20 0.22 
Balota et al. (2007) Lexical Decision task (English) 809 1686/1686†† 0.34 0.37 
Braem (2017) Task switching 49 78/78 -0.07 0.02 
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Bugg and Braver 
(2015) 
Exp 1-Task switching 52 185/199† 0.10 -0.08 
Exp 1-Rule congruency 52 192/192 0.11 0.23 
Exp 1-List congruency 52 192/192 -0.13 0.18 
Exp 2-Task switching 32 225/223† 0.24 0.30 
Exp 2-Rule congruency 32 224/224 0.18 0.32 
Exp 2-List congruency 32 224/224 -0.37 -0.09 
Exp 3-Task switching 32 123/131†† 0.22 0.26 
Exp 3-Rule congruency 32 380/126†† 0.33 0.26 
Exp 3-Incentive 32 46/47†† 0.07 0.02 
Exp 3-Mixed task 32 252/123 0.43 0.26 
Chen et al. (2015) Flanker 42 120/120 0.14 0.25 
Cherkasova  et al 
(2002) Task-switch (antisaccade) 18 104/104 -0.14 -0.21 
Chetverikov et al. 
(2017) Flanker (colour) 58 120/120 0.09 0.13 
De Simoni & Von 
Bastian (2018) 
Simon 216 192/192 0.33 0.38 
Stroop 216 192/192 0.21 0.19 
Numeric Stroop 216 192/192 0.24 0.19 
Navon (conflict) 216 192/192 0.52 0.27 
Task switching (animacy/size) 216 128/128 -0.03 0.01 
Task switching (shape/colour) 216 128/128 0.02 -0.01 
Task switching (parity/magnitude) 216 128/128 0.02 0.04 
Task switching (fill/frame) 216 128/128 0.07 0.05 
Task mixing (animacy/size) 216 512/128 0.15 0.20 
Task mixing (shape/colour) 216 512/128 0.08 0.15 
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Task mixing (parity/magnitude) 216 512/128 0.19 0.18 
Task mixing (fill/frame) 216 512/128 0.05 0.21 
Ebersole et al. (2016) Stroop 3305 21/42 0.15 0.12 
Elchlepp et al. (2017) Task-switch 21 878/438†† 0.11 0.08 
Ferrand et al. (2010) Lexical decision task (French) 868 1000/1000 0.55 0.55 
Gonthier et al. (2016) Stroop (picture/word) 95 600/600 0.28 0.31 
Guye & Von Bastian 
(2017) 
Flanker 142 192/192 -0.45 -0.08 
Simon 142 192/192 0.38 0.43 
Stroop 142 192/192 0.46 0.37 
Task switching (animacy/size) 142 128/128 0.15 0.12 
Task switching (shape/colour) 142 128/128 0.09 0.16 
Task switching (parity/magnitude) 142 128/128 0.18 0.13 
Single vs. mixed task (animacy/size) 142 512/128 -0.13 -0.09 
Single vs. mixed task (shape/colour) 142 512/128 0.26 0.16 
Single vs. mixed task (parity/magnitude) 142 512/128 0.02 0.04 
Hefer et al. (2017) Flanker 73 60/60 -0.02 0.02 
Flanker 64 72/72 0.04 0.13 
Kelly et al. (2008) Flanker 26 24/24 0.29 0.16 
Keuleers et al. (2010) Lexical decision task (Dutch) 39 14089/14089 0.73 0.71 
Keuleers et al. (2012) Lexical decision task (English) 79 14365/14365 0.78 0.81 
Klein et al. (2017) Stroop 276 80/80 0.10 0.02 
Klemen et al.(2011) Flanker 18 48/48 -0.24 -0.12 
Kreitz et al. (2015) Flanker 120 50/50 0.22 0.26 
Flanker 197 50/50 0.24 0.22 
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Mennes et al. (2012) Simon 21 96/96 0.29 0.21 
Peronne-Bertolotti et 
al. (2017) 
Manual 'antisaccade' 44 256/256 -0.03 -0.11 
Task mixing 44 256/256 0.03 0.03 
Rusconi et al. (2013) SNARC 17 56/56 0.31 0.28 
Sandra  and Otto 
(2018) 
Stroop 57 90/30 0.48 0.49 
Task switching 62 130/148†† 0.21 0.21 
Reward 62 140/140 0.41 0.50 
Saunders et al. (2015) Flanker 56 250/250 0.28 0.36 
Flanker 58 250/250 0.58 0.59 
Saunders et al. (2018) Stroop 217 288/288 0.28 0.29 
Flanker 2249 50/50 0.51 0.39 
Von Bastian et al. 
(2016) 
Flanker 120 48/48 -0.05 -0.08 
Simon 120 150/50 0.15 0.22 
Numerical Stroop 120 48/48 0.36 0.31 
Task switching (animacy/size) 120 64/64 -0.08 -0.09 
Task switching (colour/shape) 120 64/64 0.07 -0.02 
Task switching (parity/size) 120 64/64 -0.18 -0.17 
Single vs. mixed task (animacy/size) 120 256/64 0.09 0.10 
Single vs. mixed task (colour/shape) 120 256/64 0.14 0.12 
Single vs. mixed task (parity/size) 120 256/64 0.03 0.11 
Wöstmann et al. 
(2013) 
Flanker 23 80/80 -0.13 0.08 
Simon 23 320/120 0.35 0.26 
Xu et al. (2014) Age Implicit Association Test (IAT) 981873 40/40 0.27 0.38 
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Arab IAT 338103 40/40 0.07 0.17 
Asian IAT 374882 40/40 0.18 0.26 
Disability IAT 309792 40/40 0.26 0.37 
Gender-Career IAT 852861 40/40 0.18 0.28 
Gender-Science IAT 636003 40/40 0.19 0.28 
Native American IAT 217444 40/40 0.21 0.28 
President IAT 379465 40/40 0.21 0.31 
Race IAT 3339097 40/40 0.30 0.40 
Religion IAT 169247 40/40 0.18 0.28 
Sexuality IAT 1452795 40/40 0.24 0.35 
Skin colour IAT 872781 40/40 0.26 0.36 
Weapons IAT 534563 40/40 0.21 0.32 
Weight IAT 969372 40/40 0.26 0.36 
Zwann et al. (2017) Flanker 160 64/64 -0.08 -0.09 
Simon 160 92/92 0.43 0.42 
Previously 
reported 
correlations 
Manoach et al (2002) Task-switch (antisaccade) -
schizophrenia 21 104/104 -0.05 
 
Task-switch (antisaccade) - controls 16 104/104 0.22  
Draheim et al. (2016) Task switching 552 96/96 -0.08  
Hughes et al. (2014) Task switching 1902 46/98  0.01 
Task switching 46 264/120  0.21 
Kane and Engle 
(2003) 
Stroop 87 36/36 -0.02 
 
Stroop 88 36/36 0.17 
 
Stroop 138 36/36 0.10 
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MacLeod et al. (2010) Attention Networks Test – Alerting 1129 72/72 -0.10 
 
Attention Networks Test – Orienting 1129 72/72 0.05 
 
Attention Networks Test: Executive 1129 96/96 0.21 
 
Paap and Sawi (2014) Manual "antisaccade" 117 30/60 0.29 
 
Rondeel et al. (2015) Stroop 35 54/54 0.20 
 
Wylie et al. (2009) Flanker (Parkinsons patients) 50 103/103 
-0.39 
 
σote: Where authors are italicised, correlations are calculated from summary data, rather than trial by trial data. †Dataset combines two groups of participants who underwent 
the same procedure with different trial numbers. † †Trial numbers varied between participants due to task design (e.g. randomised trials). Averages are reported. The 
correlations in Draheim et al. (2016) were reported for data from a manuscript under review (Shipsted et al.). The word vs. non-word effects are reported for lexical decision 
tasks. 
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Table 2. 
Parameters used for model simulations. Parameters that are varied in simulations are denoted in bold. Ranges and fixed values were informed 
by previous simulations and implementations of each model in the literature (Bompas & Sumner, 2011; Donkin et al., 2011; Ulrich et al., 2015) 
and parameters are not intended to be compared across models, but simply supplied for information. 
Model Parameters 
 Response selection Response caution      
DDM 
Incongruent drift rate 
(V2) 
Boundary 
separation (a) 
Congruent drift rate 
(V1) 
Variability in drift 
rates(η) 
Start point bias 
(a/z) 
Within-trial noise 
(s) 
 
.1 - .4 .07 - .16 0.45 0.1 0.5 0.1  
LBA 
Incongruent drift rate 
(V2) 
Threshold (b) Congruent drift rate 
(V1) 
Variability in drift rates 
(s) 
Variability in start 
points (A) 
 
 
.95-.65 250-600 1 0.27 250  
 
DMC 
Amplitude of automatic 
activation (A) 
Boundary 
separation (b) 
Controlled process 
drift rate (µc) 
Time-to-peak of 
automatic activation (Ĳ) 
Start point shape 
(α) 
Within-trial noise 
(ı) 
Automatic 
activation shape (a) 
10-28 35-65 0.63 90 2 4 2 
ALIGATER 
Reactive inhibition 
strength (Iendo) 
Threshold (Th) Drift rates 
(µc, µi) 
Variability in drift rates 
(η) 
Mutual inhibition 
strength (w) 
Mutual inhibition 
delay (δw) 
Reactive inhibition 
delay (δendo) 
0.01-.0.022 0.7-1.3 0.0078 0.0039 0.01 1ms 70ms 
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Table 3.  
Sample sizes and Pearson’s R correlations between RT and error costs from Studies 1 and 2. 
Standard-Speed instruction coefficients are the difference between the Fisher’s z-transformed 
coefficients. See Supplementary Material I for scatter plots. 
    Instruction condition   
Dataset N Speed Standard Accuracy Speed-Standard 
Flanker 1 Session 1 55 0.56 0.36 0.31 0.24 
Flanker 1 Session 2 47 0.40 0.34 -0.01 0.07 
Stroop 1 Session 1 52 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.00 
Stroop 1 Session 2 46 0.33 0.15 0.21 0.19 
Flanker 2 81 0.46 0.23 0.01 0.26 
Dot-motion 2 73 0.22 -0.07 -0.04 0.28 
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Table 4.  
Spearman’s Correlations between RT costs and error costs in the Simon task in Study 3 
(N=102). ‘Mixed’ refers to the costs calculated from blocks in which congruent and 
incongruent trials are intermixed. ‘Blocked’ refers to costs calculated from separate blocks 
of congruent and incongruent trials. The highlighted cells contain the correlations central to 
our hypothesis. 
  RT cost - mixed Error cost - mixed RT cost - blocked Error cost - blocked 
RT cost - mixed  0.61*** 0.10 0.10 
Error cost - mixed   -0.02 0.14 
RT cost - blocked    -.20* 
Mean  20ms*** 3.4%***  46m*** 3.6%*** 
Std. Dev 17ms 5.0% 24ms 5.0% 
Note *p<.05, ***p<.001 
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Figure 1. PRISMA flow diagram illustrating our process for identifying eligible articles and 
datasets. N refers to records (articles or records on data repositories), K refers to correlations 
identified. Manual searches refers to records obtained through reference lists, Google, and 
manually searching data repositories (e.g. OSF.io).   
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Figure 2. Funnel plot of observed effect sizes (Pearson’s R) for correlations between RT 
costs and error costs with associated standard errors. Larger values on the y-axis reflect larger 
sample sizes. Solid black line indicates weighted mean effect from a random effects model. 
Grey area indicates 95% confidence region. Dashed black lines show 95% confidence 
intervals of the mean effect estimated from a random-effects model. Red line indicates an 
effect size of zero. The lexical decision task effects are shown in black circles, all other tasks 
are shown in gray (see text for details).  
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Figure 3. Schematic of two sequential sampling models. i) The drift-diffusion model 
(Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008) consists of a single accumulator accruing 
evidence from a starting point (z) to one or the other response threshold (a and 0). The drift 
rate on each simulated trial is taken from a distribution that has a mean (v) and standard 
deviation (η) across trials, and is subject to within-trial noise (s). ii) The LBA model consists 
of an accumulator for each response option, accruing evidence to a common response 
threshold (b). On each simulated trial, drift rates are taken from distributions which have a 
mean (vc, ve) and standard deviation (s), and begin accumulating evidence from a starting 
point selected from a uniform distribution (A-0). The models also normally add non-decision 
time to capture sensory and motor delays, but here we simply assume this is a constant, as 
variance in non-decision time is not needed for our discussion.  
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AND DECISION MODELS 
 97 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Schematic of two sequential sample models for conflict tasks. i) The diffusion 
model for conflict tasks, DMC (Ulrich et al., 2015), an extension of the drift-diffusion model 
to accommodate the flanker and Simon tasks. The DMC adds a transient input for the 
irrelevant competing information (black gamma function in the lower panel) to the sustained 
linear process for the correct information (μc: grey line in the lower panel). The gamma 
function, defined by the parameters A, a and Ĳ, provides an impulse function, so that the 
irrelevant features (e.g. the flankers) initially have a large input, which diminishes rapidly 
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within the trial. ii) ALIGATER is an extension of LATER (Carpenter and Williams, 1995) 
originally tested in the context of saccadic interference effects (Bompas & Sumner, 2011). 
Two LATER units, one for the target and one for the distractor, attempt to rise to threshold 
while mutually inhibiting each other. To produce goal-directed selectivity ALIGATER 
includes reactive inhibition instead of altering drift rates. This inhibition attenuates the 
activation in the distractor node by a specified amount (Iendo) after a delay (δendo) (lower right 
panel). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AND DECISION MODELS 
 99 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Pattern of RT costs and Error costs produced by variation in response caution and 
selection in the drift diffusion model. Straight, solid lines show condition averages, faint lines 
show example individual trials. Black lines show drift rates in congruent/baseline condition, 
coloured lines show incongruent condition. A. Response caution: Individuals who are low in 
response caution will set a lower threshold (e.g. grey dotted line) than highly cautious 
individuals (black dotted line). This means not only that their RTs will be faster, but also the 
difference between conditions will be smaller, leading to smaller RT costs, noted by grey 
arrows compared to black arrows. However, the lower threshold will lead to more errors due 
to noise in the accumulation process, which can be overcome with higher thresholds 
(example trial in purple reaches the grey error threshold, but not the black error threshold). 
Note that this will predominantly affect the incongruent or more difficult condition, as errors 
are rare in congruent/baseline conditions, leading to higher relative error costs. B. Response 
selection: Individuals who have high selection efficiency will have relatively higher drift 
rates in incongruent conditions (red solid lines) compared to individuals with lower selection 
efficiency (blue solid lines), leading to smaller RT costs (noted by red arrows compared to 
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blue arrows). Moreover, the higher drift rate means noise is less likely to cause the incorrect 
response (illustrated with blue example trial that reaches the error threshold). Note that 
individuals could also vary in their average drift rates in congruent conditions, and the 
conclusions would remain the same, since the same difference in drift rate between 
conditions creates larger costs if average drift rates are lower. For simplicity we keep average 
congruent drift rates constant in our simulations. 
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Figure 6. Simulated error costs and RT costs produced by four decision models. DDM = 
Drift-diffusion model, LBA = Linear ballistic accumulator model, DMC = Diffusion model 
for conflict tasks, ALIGATER = Approximately linear rise to threshold with ergodic rate. 
The first and second columns show the patterns of error costs and RT costs, respectively, as a 
function of variation in both caution and response selection as implemented in the different 
models (see main text for details). The third column shows the correlation between RT costs 
and error costs that arise from holding response selection constant and allowing caution to 
vary (purple line and crosses), and for allowing response selection to vary while caution is 
held constant (grey line and circles). Though the simulated data are often non-linear, linear 
trend lines are plotted for illustrative purposes since most studies of individual differences 
would calculate linear correlations. Note some changes of scale between plots, due to the 
range of parameters used, as guided by previous literature (see text). Trials with decision 
times longer than 2000ms were excluded from the plots. 
 
 
